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Recent Developments 
Hayes v. State 
Substitution of an Alternate Juror May Be Done at any Time before the Jury 
Closes the Jury Room Door to Begin Deliberations 
I n a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland recently considered the 
meaning of the phrase "when the jury 
retires to consider its verdict" from 
Md. Rule 4-312(b)(3), and how it 
applies to substituting an alternate 
juror. The court of appeals found the 
rule's intention to be that the 
substitution of an alternate juror is 
impermissible after the jury has left the 
courtroom to consider its verdict and 
has closed the jury room door for 
deliberations. Hayes v. State, 355 
Md. 615, 735 A.2d 1109 (1999). 
The court declared that closing the jury 
room door marks the point at which 
the ability to substitute a juror ends. 
Following closing arguments 
and jury instructions in the trial of John 
Hayes ("Hayes"), Judge Kahl of the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County 
thanked and excused the alternate 
juror. The judge directed the 
remaining jurors to retire to the jury 
room and begin deliberations. Soon 
thereafter, the judge called Hayes 
back into the courtroom and told him 
that one of the jurors became ill as 
soon as the jury had left to begin 
deliberations. The judge notified 
Hayes that because he felt actual jury 
deliberations had not yet begun, he 
would substitute the sick juror with the 
excused alternate juror who had not 
yet left the building. Defense counsel 
objected. 
By Jennifer Golub 
The jury convicted Hayes of 
robbery and various handgun charges 
and sentenced him to twenty-five 
years in prison. Hayes appealed to 
the Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed the circuit 
court's holding. Hayes then appealed 
to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
which reversed the intermediate 
appellate court's decision. 
The major issue before the court 
of appeals was at what point in a trial 
does the jury "retire to consider its 
verdict," pursuant to Maryland Rule 
4-312(b)(3). Hayes, 355 Md. at 
620, 735 A.2d at 1111. The court 
highlighted Rule 4-312(b )(3) as the 
current law dealing with alternate 
jurors in criminal cases. [d. at 621, 
735 A.2d at 1112 (citing Md. Rule 
4-312(b)(3)). In capital cases, the 
court noted, the rule provides for two 
alternate jurors, subject to restrictions 
ofthe jUdge. [d. Furthermore, the 
rule provides that an alternate cannot 
be substituted during actual 
deliberations or sentencing. [d. In 
non-capital cases, an alternate who 
does not replace a juror shall be 
discharged "when the jury retires to 
consider its verdict." [d. (citing Md. 
Rule 4-312(b)(3)). 
Because the court had not 
previously considered the meaning of 
the phrase "when the jury retires to 
consider its verdict," nor had the court 
ever determined the effect of a 
violation of the rule, the court turned 
to both state and federal case law of 
other jurisdictions which have dealt 
with the issue of timing and violations 
regarding the substitution of an 
alternate juror. [d. at 622-23, 735 
A.2d at 1112-13. In so doing, the 
court analyzed two categories of 
cases: (1) cases where the 
substitution was made before the 
beginning of deliberations; and (2) 
cases where the substitution was 
made after the commencement of 
deliberations. [d. In the former 
situation, most courts have upheld the 
substitution pnor to the 
commencement of deliberations, and 
in the latter, courts have been mixed 
in their holdings. ld. 
The court examined Rule 24( c) 
of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure ("FRCP") which allows, 
foregoing its amendment in April of 
1999, substitution "prior to" the time 
the jury retires. [d. However, the 
court observed that in practice, this 
rule has been applied beyond its 
limitations. [d. The court then 
focused on the most recent changes 
to FRCP 24(c). Id. at 625, 735 
A.2dat 1114. The Supreme Court's 
April, 1999 amendment to FRCP 
24( c) became effective December 1, 
1999, and the rule now allows 
substitution of alternates after 
deliberations have begun. ld. The 
new provision states that "when the 
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jury retires to consider the verdict, the 
court, in its discretion, may retain the 
alternate jurors during deliberations." 
Id. (quoting Amendments to the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 
119 S. Ct. Ct. R-5, 8 (1999)). The 
rule now indicates, however, that if an 
alternate replaces an impaneled juror 
after deliberations have begun, the jury 
should be instructed to begin new 
deliberations. Id. The court 
acknowledged that the change to Rule 
24( c) allows the federal courts to 
continue a practice already in 
existence. Id. at 626, 735 A.2d at 
1115. 
The court of appeals also 
discussed various cases which 
address the meaning of the current 
language of Rule 24(c). Id. at 626-
34, 735 A.2d at 1115-20. The 
federal cases cited by the court show 
that, prior to the amendment, federal 
courts allowed jurors to be substituted 
after the start of deliberations, 
concluding that substantial rights were 
not violated. Id. The court noted that 
federal cases also suggested that it was 
permissible to recall an alternate juror 
who had been discharged. Id. at 632, 
735 A.2d at 1118. The court 
recognized that other decisions have 
been upheld by the use of the harmless 
error doctrine. Id. at 634, 735 A.2d 
at 1119. 
The court of appeals stated that 
they could not change the language of 
Rule 4-312(b)(3), nor could they 
"circumvent the rule through an 
expansive harmless error or 
presumptive non-prejudice doctrine 
that is entirely foreign to our 
jurisprudence." Id. at 635,735 A.2d 
at 1119-20. Any change in the rule, 
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the court held, must come from the 
legislature. Id. at 635, 735 A.2d at 
1120. 
In the instant case, the court of 
appeals concluded that an alternate 
juror may be substituted for a regular 
juror until such a time as the jUlY enters 
the jury room to consider its verdict, 
and closes the door if (1 )the alternate 
juror remained qualified, and (2) the 
regular juror is properly discharged. 
Id. The closing of the door, however, 
is the point at which any ability to 
substitute ends because, up until that 
point, the defendant is not prejUdiced 
as the jury has not discussed the case 
and the alternate juror has not been 
subjected to outside influences. Id. 
at 636, 735 A.2d at 1120. 
The court defended its holding 
as a practical standard which 
addresses time lapses between 
closing arguments and deliberations, 
and promotes simplicity and fairness 
in administration. Id. The court 
opined that the rule, as set forth, will 
lead to easy compliance, and moots 
the issue as to what happened after 
the door closed. Id. The exact time 
the door closed, the court stated, 
could be established through objective 
and extrinsic evidence. Id. The court 
also added that the time the door 
closed should be made a matter of 
record. Id. at 637, 735 A.2d at 1120. 
Through its ruling, the court rendered 
moot another issue raised by Hayes, 
that a discharged alternate may not 
be recalled, because jurors should 
remain qualified until substitution is no 
longer allowed, or until the door 
closes. Id. at 637,735 A.2d at 1121. 
The court applied its holding to 
the petitioner's case, and found that 
Hayes did preserve his complaint 
regarding the substitution. Id. The 
court remanded the case back to the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore County to 
determine how it was concluded that 
deliberations had not yet begun. Id. 
at 638,735 A.3d at 1121. There was 
nothing on the record to make that 
issue clear to the court of appeals, nor 
was there any evidence shown that 
there was any examination of the 
dismissed alternate to determine 
whether he was subjected to any 
outside influences. Id. 
In Hayes, the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland declined to follow federal 
practice. Accordingly, Maryland law 
is now distinctively different from 
federal law with regard to the 
substitution of alternate jurors. It is 
important for Maryland practitioners 
to recognize this distinction so that 
they may tailor their litigation to 
comply with the correct interpretation 
of the rule which applies in their 
respective situations. The court also 
sets forth a bright line test in a case of 
first impression and provides that, in 
Maryland, deliberations commence 
when the jury room door shuts and 
the time the door shuts should be made 
part of the record. 
